Evolution of cooperation by generalized reciprocity.
- Pfeiffer T Behavioural Ecology, University of Berne, Hinterkappelen, Switzerland. thomas.pfeiffer@inf.ethz.ch
- Rutte C
- Killingback T
- Taborsky M
- Bonhoeffer S
- 2005-07-19
Published in:
- Proceedings. Biological sciences. - 2005
Altruism
Biological Evolution
Cognition
Computer Simulation
Cooperative Behavior
Game Theory
Humans
Markov Chains
Models, Theoretical
English
The evolution of cooperation by direct reciprocity requires that individuals recognize their present partner and remember the outcome of their last encounter with that specific partner. Direct reciprocity thus requires advanced cognitive abilities. Here, we demonstrate that if individuals repeatedly interact within small groups with different partners in a two person Prisoner's Dilemma, cooperation can emerge and also be maintained in the absence of such cognitive capabilities. It is sufficient for an individual to base their decision of whether or not to cooperate on the outcome of their last encounter--even if it was with a different partner.
- Language
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- English
- Open access status
- green
- Identifiers
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- DOI 10.1098/rspb.2004.2988
- PMID 16024372
- Persistent URL
- https://sonar.rero.ch/global/documents/43
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